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Development and Environmental Injustice in Malaysia:  
A Story of Indigenous Resistance in Sarawak 
 
May Tay1 
Yale-NUS 
 
 
Abstract:  In 2008, the Federal Government of Malaysian announced an initiative to build 
20,000 megawatts of mega dams along a 320km corridor in Sarawak. Named the Sarawak 
Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE), the scheme would create one of five regional 
development corridors throughout Malaysia, and was part of the government’s strategy to make 
the state of Sarawak ‘developed’ by 2020 through industrialization and renewable energy 
development (Recoda). Of the mega dams planned for construction by 2020, three have been 
completed, with construction for the others underway and the construction process frequently 
delayed by resistance from local indigenous communities. Indigenous tribe members who 
perceived their communities as being shortchanged and deceived by the government put up 
various forms of resistance to the projects. This paper looks into indigenous resistance against 
the Baram and Bakun mega dam projects as a means of exploring the broader nature of historical 
indigenous resistance to development projects in Sarawak, Malaysia. I argue that the indigenous 
people’s resistance to development projects in Sarawak, contrary to their portrayal as being anti-
development and backwards, represents frustrated attempts to fight egregious forms of 
distribution, recognition and procedural environmental injustices. Indigenous tribes struggle 
amidst a challenging climate of political pressure to become ‘developed’ according to an 
authority-defined discourse of development, and under adverse terms of inclusion in the 
Malaysian government’s rural development strategy. 
 
  
In 2008, the Federal Government of Malaysian announced an initiative to build 20,000 MW of 
mega dams along a 320km corridor in Sarawak (Sovacool & Bulan 113). Named the Sarawak 
Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE), the scheme would create one of five regional 
development corridors throughout Malaysia, and was part of the government’s strategy to make 
the state of Sarawak ‘developed’ by 2020 through industrialization and renewable energy 
development (Recoda). Of the mega dams planned for construction by 2020, 3 have been 
completed, with construction for the others underway, and the construction process frequently 
delayed by resistance from local indigenous communities along river belt. Indigenous tribe 
members who perceived their communities as being short changed and deceived by the 
government put up various forms of resistance to the projects. This paper looks into the issues 
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surrounding indigenous resistance against the Baram and Bakun mega dam projects as a means 
of exploring the nature of historical indigenous resistance to development projects in Sarawak, 
Malaysia. I argue that indigenous resistance to development projects in Sarawak, contrary to 
their portrayal as being anti-development and backwards, represents frustrated attempts to fight 
egregious forms of distribution, recognition and procedural environmental injustices. These 
indigenous tribes struggle amidst a challenging climate of political pressure to become 
‘developed’ according to a domineering authority-defined discourse of development, and under 
adverse terms of inclusion in the Malaysian government’s rural development strategy. 
 
Lauded as the “biggest and most important development plan that has ever been undertaken by 
the Sarawak government” by Sarawak State Secretary Datuk Amar Wilson Baya Dandot 
(“RECODA”), the multi-hundred billion dollar Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy 
(SCORE) plan aims to transform Sarawak into a ‘developed’ state by 2020 (Recoda). To achieve 
this goal, the government outlined the development of ten priority sectors: aluminum, glass, 
steel, oil-based industries, palm oil, fishing & agriculture, livestock, timber-based industries, 
marine and tourism (Recoda). While Sarawak’s current energy output stands at 1,182MW 
(Wong), the SCORE plan is expected to expand Sarawak’s economy fivefold and double its 
population. In order to meet future energy needs of up to 8,000MW, hydropower was seen as a 
suitable and clean solution (Wong). Of the 12 mega dams planned for construction by 2020 
along Sarawak’s river belt, 3 have been completed in Batang Ai, Murun and Bakun.  
 
The Bakun Dam 
 
Since it was first proposed in the 1980s, the Bakun Dam was envisioned as an ambitious and 
integral enabler of Sarawak’s economic transformation. At 207 meters high, with a crest length 
of 750 meters and base width of 560 meters, the concrete-faced dam of up to 2400 MW in 
installed capacity is one of the biggest rockfall dams ever constructed, and currently stands as 
Asia’s second largest dam (Oh, Chua, and Goh 1035-1037; Lee, Viswanathan, and Ali 65). Plans 
like this to exploit the hydroelectric potential of Sarawak’s rivers were part of Wawasan 2020, or 
Vision 2020, which was the master development plan for a fully industrialized Malaysia 
conceived in 1991 by its then Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad (Economic Planning Unit). 
The master plan involved multiple large-scale and capital-intensive projects, and initiatives for 
big dams such as the Bakun Dam figured centrally (Sovacool and Bulan 125).  
 
However, faced with concerted campaigns by local indigenous communities and social justice 
groups in Malaysia, the government called off plans for construction in 1990, although it later 
managed to revive the project in September 1993. The project was re-emphasized as a solution to 
increasing energy needs in Peninsular Malaysia, where in the words of the Prime Minister: 
“Bakun will not only provide the cheapest source of energy but also serve as a catalyst to the 
country’s industrialization program” (Coalition of Concerned NGOs on Bakun). Due to multiple 
delays over the years, the project was completed only in 2011 at a steep cost of RM 7.3 billion 
(US$2.28 billion) from an initial RM 4 billion (US$1.25 billion) (Oh, Chua, and Goh 1037). By 
then, the Bakun Dam project was seen as a part of promising progress on the SCORE plan 
proposed in 2008, which among many goals sought to fully exploit Sarawak’s potential as a 
major source of renewable energy from hydroelectric power dams (Sibon). 
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Major ecological and social sacrifices had to be made to construct the massive Bakun Dam, 
resulting in strong local and international opposition to the Bakun Dam. In all, 70,000 ha of 
virgin rainforests and prime farmlands along nearby river belts were flooded (Raman 41), while 
23,000 ha of virgin tropical rainforests were cut down (Oh, Chua and Goh 1040). About 10,000 
people, comprising indigenous communities from the Kayan, Kenyah, Kajang, Ukit and Penan 
tribes, were forced to relocate from their traditional homes to Sungei Asap under a government 
resettlement program (Raman 41). Opposition mainly took the form of non-violent blockades to 
access roads and a Coalition of Concerned NGOs on Bakun, comprising more than 40 Malaysian 
NGOs and other international organizations, and the opposition political party Democratic 
Action Party (DAP), which together called for the scrapping of the project on grounds of threats 
to the economy, ecology and livelihood of indigenous people (Osman 982). In response to 
protests and blockades from those in opposition, the government used hard-handed measures to 
punish opponents to the Bakun Dam, through arrests, censorship and nationalist discourse that 
cast indigenous opposition as anti-development (Osman 985-986) or brainwashed by malicious 
‘western’ agendas to sabotage development in Malaysia. In the case of the latter, the Prime 
Minister once lambasted foreign NGOs supporting the anti-Bakun Dam movement saying, “They 
want us to be deprived of every development which could uplift our standards of living. They 
want us to be no different from animals which are good for their research and study” (qtd. in 
Bocking 16). 
 
The Baram Dam 
 
The Baram Dam is another major hydroelectric power dam planned for development along the 
Sarawak river belt as part of the SCORE plan. Even though the Baram Dam is smaller than the 
Bakun Dam, its completion will see the flooding of 41,180 ha of rainforest and displacement 
20,000 indigenous people from 26 villages along the Baram river, mostly from the Kenyah, 
Kayan and Penan tribes (Gan).  
 
Opposition against the Baram Dam is particularly strong, organized and well-connected. The 
SAVE Rivers Network was formed in February 2012 after a meeting of 150 indigenous 
representatives to share their experiences as affected victims of the Baram Dam plans and issue a 
joint statement demanding immediate cessation of all dam projects along the Sarawak river belt 
and public discussion on future large scale development projects (International Rivers). 
Blockades were first set up on the 23rd of October in 2013 to stop construction of access roads to 
the proposed dam site (The Borneo Post Online). Subsequently, communities comprising 
representatives from different indigenous tribes began managing two blockade sites, one at 
mouth of the access road near Long Lama, and another closer to the dam site (The Borneo Post 
Online). These blockades eventually became permanent observatories from which local 
communities could monitor construction progress and host interested local and international 
allies. When I visited the blockade sites in January 2016, I was told that the Long Lama blockade 
I saw was the thirteenth version; it had previously been torn down twelve times by 
representatives from the construction company and government-sponsored thugs, under 
occasionally violent circumstances (Kayan Protestors at Long Lama).  
 
The protest movement has a website hosted by the Sarawak Report website, with active Twitter 
and social media presence. In May 2013, more than 300 local indigenous representatives staged a 
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public protest against the SCORE hydroelectric dam projects at the opening of the International 
Hydropower Association World Congress held in Sarawak, after a local indigenous 
representative was prevented from attending a pre-conference workshop (Hance). Petitions were 
also signed and submitted to the Sarawak government. Official responses to the Baram Dam 
protests bore an uncanny similarity to government responses to the anti-Bakun Dam movement; 
violence against blockade caretakers was not uncommon, environmental and social impact 
assessments were constantly mired in secrecy, and construction work undertaken in spite of local 
resistance. 
 
Indigenous struggles as a story of environmental injustice 
 
In demonstrating how indigenous resistance towards the Bakun and Baram hydroelectric power 
dam projects is not driven by a backward or anti-development sentiment, I intend to adopt the 
environmental justice paradigm. The suitability of this framework is best explained by Dorceta 
Taylor, who in explicating the merits of the environmental justice movement and paradigm states 
that “human concerns and problems cannot be separated from environmental and social 
problems” (557). For one, environmental issues are closely related to problems associated with 
infrastructure development projects, especially in the case of the Bakun and Baram dams, which 
are large-scale physical infrastructure projects with massive ecological and social effects. In 
addition, seeing indigenous struggles against development projects as a fight for environmental 
justice also recognizes the fact that indigenous cultures and lifestyles are deeply rooted in a 
connection to their local environment and land. 
 
According to Robert Figueroa, the environmental justice paradigm can be understood through 
three main branches of environmental justice—distributive, recognition and procedural. 
Distributive justice is understood in terms of the equitable balance of environmental benefits and 
burdens. Benefits include those from industrial development, such as jobs, educational 
opportunities, infrastructural improvements, increased respect, adequate compensation for harms 
and access to economic and natural resources (Figueroa 360). Harms could include 
environmental degradation, loss of access to resources and increased stigma. Recognition justice 
calls for the political recognition of those who are most affected, with the understanding that 
equitable participation determining who has the power to redistribute environmental harms and 
benefits is key to ensuring parity of outcome for all (Figueroa 367). Procedural justice views 
justice as a process, and looks into an individual or community’s right to participate and exercise 
agency in institutional procedures. David Schlosberg identifies procedural justice as a means of 
achieving both distributional equity and political recognition (84).  
 
Distributive Injustice 
 
The construction of mega dams generally come at great ecological and environmental costs, both 
present and future, and these costs are largely accrued to communities in the local area. In the 
case of both the Bakun and Baram dams, mandatory resettlement of large numbers of indigenous 
people is needed. Up to 10,000 indigenous tribe members were forced to resettle in Sungei Asap 
in the case of the Bakun Dam, while up to 20,000 indigenous people will have to move for the 
Baram Dam. Being forced to move away from their ancestral homes constitutes a form of 
environmental harm for the communities involved.  
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Life did not improve or stay the same after moving to Sungei Asap either. Common grievances 
included sub-standard housing which the indigenous people had to pay for when they previously 
did not have to pay for housing, inadequate and degraded land for farming, lack of access to 
nearby food sources, and difficulties securing employment (Raman 41). 
 
While Figueroa would point out that adequate compensation may be able to improve distributive 
injustice (360), it was found that communities that relocated to Sungei Asap, 30 kilometers 
inland from the dam site, did not in fact receive benefits that were promised to them. This was 
most prominent in terms of land compensation, where even though initial land holdings ranged 
from 0 to 200 ha per household, each household was awarded a uniform 1.2 ha of land (Lee, 
Viswanathan, and Ali 368). Most households thus experienced severely reduced ability to 
maintain the small farms they did before for subsistence living. They also suffered from the 
degraded and much less fertile land in Sungei Asap. Especially since the resettled indigenous 
groups were previously subsistence farmers for generations with no previous participation in the 
Sarawak economy (Oh, Chua, and Goh 1040), relocating to Sungei Asap posed an existential 
threat to indigenous people, who found it hard to harvest food that was sufficient for survival. 
Considering that the key focus of compensation policies is to ensure that nobody suffers welfare 
loss as a result of resettlement (Lee, Viswanathan, and Ali 64), the Bakun resettlement policy 
also failed to ensure fair compensation and distributive justice as a result. 
 
In the case of the Bakun and Baram dam projects, future local environmental degradation must 
be considered too. It is known that the construction of mega dams will alter the hydrology of 
rivers and quality of water downstream, which will affect thousands of people living downstream 
of the dam sites (Oh, Chua, and Goh 1040). In addition, given plans to create aluminum smelters 
downstream that could be powered by the energy infrastructure projects in Sarawak, it is clear 
that the river belt indigenous communities will further suffer from pollution caused by aluminum 
smelting in the future (Oh, Chua, and Goh 1040). Yet, such considerations for future losses were 
conspicuously absent from compensation procedures or interactions between officials, corporate 
representatives and indigenous leaders. 
 
Participatory Justice 
 
The problems with compensation procedures for the Bakun project extend beyond parity of 
result, and are speaks to other forms of inequitable processes at play common to both the Baram 
and Bakun projects. Both projects were plagued by a consistent lack of discussion with 
indigenous communities on development plans in the local area, secrecy, censorship and general 
lack of recognition of indigenous people and their historical ways of life in the Sarawak river 
belts. The lack of participatory justice is implicit from the historical practice of indigenous 
communities using non-violent blockades to interrupt access to key roads, which were used not 
to put up aggressive resistance, but to negotiate for participation in development decisions in 
Sarawak. During a blockade against logging companies given permits to log on land that local 
indigenous communities regarded as native to them, a villager said, “If we don’t blockade, who 
is going to listen to us? That’s why I blockade.” (Osman 979) 
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Indigenous voices in opposition are frequently ignored and extinguished to make smooth passage 
for authority-driven development projects. Leaders of indigenous communities protesting the 
Bakun Dam had their passports confiscated to prevent them from traveling overseas to speak out 
against the project, while lawyers from the Peninsular who were acting for the affected 
indigenous communities were denied access to Sarawak (Colchester 39). Even after organizing a 
large longboat protest against the Baram Dam at the Baram river, and collecting more than 7,000 
signatures for a petition, the opposition party The People’s Justice Party was ignored and denied 
audience with the government-appointed regional chief of Sarawak (Gan). Not only is there a 
clear lack of free, prior and informed consent for development projects in Sarawak, opposing 
choices are often not heard at all by those in power. 
 
While companies taking on construction projects are required by Malaysian law to include public 
participation in environmental impact assessments, that did not happen in this case. For the 
Bakun project, indigenous communities were provided minimal information about the Bakun 
Dam project and  denied access to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) after it was 
completed (Colchester 39). With the Baram Dam project, members of the Kayan tribe, one of the 
affected indigenous tribes, spoke of having to fill out EIA forms worded in English in spite of 
not knowing the language, and being forced to fill in fields in pencil while signing in pen (Kayan 
Protestors at Long Lama). Participatory processes, even when existent, are deeply corrupted and 
flawed. 
 
Figueroa points to a respect for a group’s environmental identity and heritage as part of 
participatory justice (371). To recognize the Sarawak river belt indigenous communities’ deep 
connection to their land for their daily lives and cultural integrity would have been to begin to 
recognize their different attitudes towards development, which I will cover later in a discussion 
of the dominant Sarawak model of development. 
 
Procedural Justice 
 
The concept of procedural justice is to view justice as a process, recognizing importance of 
procedural justice as a key enabler of or hindrance to distributive and recognition justice 
(Schlosberg 84). The Bakun and Baram dam projects were rife with violations of indigenous 
land rights and laws governing EIA participation. 
 
While federal law in Malaysia recognizes the full traditional land rights customs of the Sarawak 
indigenous people, also known as Native Customary Rights (NCR), these rights are often not 
recognized to their full extents and frequently overriden without consultation (Raman 39). In the 
case of indigenous tribe members setting up blockades at access roads leading to the Bakun and 
Baram dam sites, they did so to protect land that they considered native to them and which the 
government had unlawfully given away in logging or development permits to corporations. In 
particular, two land rights issues bear pernicious effects upon indigenous people in Sarawak: 
official attempts to undermine native land rights, and the judiciary’s failure to recognize 
evidence that the indigenous people use to prove ownership of land.  
 
Official attempts to undermine native land rights manifest in a variety of ways. For one, the 
zoning of State Land on land that is in fact left to fallow by indigenous communities takes away 
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land from these communities (Cooke 532), and creates opportunities for the government to 
award permits to parcels of this land to developers. Historically, this happened with timber 
companies, and continues to happen, only to the disadvantage of indigenous communities, many 
of which rely on subsistence farming and shifting cultivation for survival. The trend of the 
government taking away land from indigenous communities extends back to the mid-1995, when 
the Sarawak government began promoting the New Concept of Native Customary Land 
Development, which was an initiative for indigenous people to lease out their native customary 
lands to private oil palm plantation developers for 60 to 90 years, with the likely result of 
indigenous groups losing their lands altogether (Choy 983). To make matters worse, in the case 
of the Bakun dam, it was found that state planners in Sarawak had changed the land code while 
the Bakun project was ongoing to limit indigenous people’s claims to their native lands and 
access to grievance mechanisms (Sovacool and Bulan 4852). 
 
Malaysia also has a restrictive land code that does not recognize the methods that indigenous 
communities use to establish their claim on native customary land (Sovacool and Bulan 4851). 
According to Mike Bujang, secretary of Save Rivers, a non-profit organization comprising 
indigenous leaders who have been central in protesting the Baram dam and other megadam plans 
in Sarawak, indigenous tribes are required to provide proof that they have been consistently 
cultivating a piece of land in order to claim it. The result is that claims to land previously 
cultivated and left to fallow as part of a tradition of shifting agriculture are not recognized 
(Bujang and Ngau). Additionally, indigenous tribes like the Penan that maintain trees on a piece 
of land as a source of food instead of felling trees to cultivate the land were unable to make 
successful claims on land they had been living on for 500 years (Sovacool and Bulan 4851). 
 
For aspects of the judiciary process that cater to indigenous communities, indigenous 
representatives often fought and failed to exercise their native land rights. This is most evident in 
challenges to perceived corrupted EIA processes. Baram dam opponents claimed that even 
though several EIAs were done for the project, they were completed after construction work had 
already begun, and were not released to the public, leading to the perception that the reports were 
commissioned to rubber stamp the project (Sovacool and Bulan 4852, Bocking 16). Others 
questioned the legitimacy of parts of the EIAs that underestimated hydrological data and 
predictions (Bocking 16). When representatives from affected communities of the Bakun dam 
filed a lawsuit against the construction company and the Malaysian government for not including 
public participation in 1996, the Malaysian High Court ruled in favor of the indigenous 
communities, declaring that the Bakun Dam was invalid because it did not comply with federal 
law requiring public participation in environmental impact assessments (Lee, Viswanathan, and 
Ali 66). Subsequently in 1997, the construction company and Malaysian government raised the 
issue to the Court of Appeal, which overturned the High Court’s decision and exempted the 
Bakun project from compliance with the federal Environmental Quality Act (Lee, Viswanathan, 
and Ali 66). Indigenous communities effectively had their rights to native customary land 
extinguished in the name of development. 
 
The Bakun and Baram dam projects were part of national economic development plans that 
explicitly seek to include the Sarawak indigenous communities. In the case of Vision 202, the 
former chief minister of Sarawak said, “We believe the Bakun project is the best opportunity to 
help the Orang Ulu (people of the interior) of Belaga. We want to bring the people into the 
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progress that will culminate with Vision 2020” (qt. in Choy 52.) Yet, why do indigenous 
communities in Sarawak continue to have such a contentious relationship with development?  
 
I argue that the forms of environmental injustices faced by the indigenous people of the Sarawak 
river belt are a result of a particular narrative of industrial development that is not only unaligned 
with the interests of the indigenous communities, but also includes them in economic 
development under highly disadvantageous terms, at times to the point of threatening the very 
integrity of indigenous cultures themselves. 
 
Authority-dictated development 
 
From forced resettlement to top down censorship, indigenous communities’ interactions with 
development are revealing of an authority dictated development model in Sarawak. The rural 
development initiative within the Wasawan 2020 master plan set out to transform rural and 
subsistence agriculture into industrialized and productive agriculture that emphasized better 
harvests, greater market integration and capitalization of technology (qt. in Doolittle 101). The 
objective of SCORE is also described in similar terms, to “stimulate global and domestic 
investment in traditionally rural areas to create balanced development throughout the country” 
(Recoda). Implicit in these seemingly benign government plans to integrate rural and indigenous 
communities into the national economy is what Doolittle describes as the “production of 
knowledge about the target population (rural subsistence agriculturalists)” as a means of 
justifying and deriving legitimacy for authority-dictated development (101). Such ‘knowledge’ 
portrays subsistence agriculture communities as environmentally destructive, backward, 
unproductive, undisciplined and in need of guidance, which the government prescribes as 
modernization and industrialization in the form of energy-intensive industries in Sarawak, with 
little to no consultation with these rural communities. Instead, what is relied upon to make 
decisions regarding economic development appears to be economic costs and benefits, which 
undermine the severity of non-economic losses to indigenous communities. The Bakun dam EIA, 
for instance, acknowledged “residual impacts such as those associated with population 
resettlement, wildlife displacement as well as permanent losses of some natural habitat, 
vegetation and landscape”, but justified the “losses … [with] the direct gains of renewable, 
efficient and less polluting source of energy and by the indirect gains of the spin-offs and 
multiplier opportunities of down- stream development” (qt. in Choy 958). 
 
Adverse Incorporation 
 
Further, the very nature of the development forced onto the Sarawak indigenous communities, as 
large-scale physical infrastructure development projects, invites indigenous incorporation into 
the national development narrative on very unequal terms. The key insight is that disadvantage 
and poverty do not flow just from exclusion, but from inclusion on disadvantageous terms, an 
idea that Hickey and du Toit explicate in their study of adverse inclusion and social exclusion in 
relation to chronic poverty. Especially in the case of the Bakun and Baram dams, where 
indigenous communities are forced to integrate more deeply into the market economy, injustices 
are borne from relational disadvantage rather than absolute marginalization (Hickey and Du Toit 
6). To facilitate the construction of the Bakun and Baram dam projects, local indigenous 
communities are first forced to relocate from their traditional lands and bear the burden of 
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adverse environmental effects from construction, from interim boom and bust towns of migrant 
labor to pollution from construction work and altered river patterns that affect intra-village 
commutes. Additionally, the lack of fair compensation and participation in development 
planning from the beginning, have led the newly relocated communities starting out on their 
journey to ‘full economic development’ on very disadvantaged terms. Indeed, indigenous tribe 
members who relocated to Sungei Asap found themselves unable to find jobs (Jehom 153), and 
Baram dam opponents in the Kayan tribe frequently referenced the poorer life quality of Sungei 
Asap residents as a reason for resisting the development of the Baram dam for fear of being 
worse off than before (Kayan Protestors at Long Lama).  
 
More worrisome are signs that the plans for development in Sarawak are corrosive to the 
indigenous communities affected, through land-based development that challenges the way 
indigenous tribes maintain and reproduce their collective sense of identity in close relation to 
their physical environment, and the imposition of an industrialized, disciplined order that to 
which members of indigenous tribes cannot adapt. 
 
In the case of the former, the Sarawak indigenous tribes conceive of land is very different terms 
from just in economically efficient terms. For the Penans, the forests represent their source of 
food, shelter and cultural identity, and they do not consider cultivation or development 
necessary, given that they consider the forest as providing sufficient resources for survival 
(Selvadurai et al. 76). Other tribes have been found to manage land differently from that 
advocated by the state, such as by dividing land use across purposes of community or cultural 
spaces, farming, game hunting, fallowing, cultivation and water catchments (Choy 54). The trait 
of embracing land for both use and non-use values, including considering land as intrinsically 
valuable instead of in monetary terms is common to the indigenous tribes in Sarawak (Choy 54). 
Having their land taken away without acknowledging the importance of indigenous 
communities’ environmental heritage thus demonstrates an egregious violation of recognition 
justice in the Malaysian government’s rural development plan. In particular, the importance of 
ancestral land to indigenous communities results in existential challenges in the case of 
resettlement, even if conducted under fair terms with adequate compensation. 
 
A closer look at the worse livelihoods of those resettled from the Bakun dam project reflects the 
difficulty that indigenous communities face in trying to fully adapt to the demands of life in a 
market economy. Successful integration into the market economy requires the adaption of skills, 
information and familiarity with notions of education and economic transactions that abrupt or 
disadvantageous displacement does not facilitate. The development of the Bakun Dam was found 
to have brought limited tangible benefits to the majority of indigenous communities that resettled 
in Sungei Asap (Choy 63), and many are stuck in unemployment or low-paying plantation jobs 
(Jehom 103). Unfortunately, many Sarawakian indigenous communities have historically failed 
to adapt to a life in a full-fledged market economy. Semi-nomadic Penans who were forced to 
resettle in the late 1900s due to timber and oil palm plantation developments encountered 
difficulties in seeking employment. Penans were perceived by plantation staff as lazy and 
unskilled who were “not interested to work in plantation environment because they consider it 
too hot and tough” (Selvadurai et al. 74). Penan children, who were used to joining their parents 
on hunts or fruit gathering trips, could not get used to being separated from their parents for long 
periods of time and fell behind in educational performance (Selvadurai et al. 75). Those who 
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adapt are not freed from costs either. Community spirit in indigenous groups suffers amidst the 
stresses of coping with resettlement. It is observed in Sungei Asap that indigenous groups that 
used to welcome guests with ‘ngajat’ (a traditional dance) no longer do so, an outcome that a 
villager ascribes to “everyone [being] too busy looking for money in order to survive” (Choy 
61). 
 
Development as politics 
 
The extensive difficulties that indigenous communities face in trying to adapt successfully as a 
people further poses the question: who is development really for? Instead of being able to look 
forward to development that enriches them, indigenous tribe members in opposition to the Baram 
dam, many of whom are Christian, feel marginalized in a climate of development that appears to 
benefit Malay-Muslims over other groups (Kayan Protestors at Long Lama). Indeed, the kind of 
development planned for Sarawak appears to reflect a model of resource control and state power 
imposition rather than genuine concern for raising the standard of living for the subjects of 
development (Doolittle 121). In her studies of the politics of development in Sabah, Malaysia, 
Doolittle describes how rural development in Malaysia is inherently and at times intentionally 
political, made evident in narratives that portray the inadequacies of indigenous people to 
buttress the state’s legitimacy for enforcing development (Doolittle 843), and context of a 
postcolonial bumiputera-first (meaning sons of the soil first) Malaysia that many non-Muslim 
bumiputera ironically do not feel included in (Shamsul 22). Bocking found that indigenous 
people who opposed the Bakun Dam were met with rhetorical devices with the implicit message 
that those affected should be willing to sacrifice for the good of Malaysia, and portrayed in the 
media as selfish and unpatriotic. This is unsurprising, given the multiple instances that 
indigenous concerns have been ignored and censored to make smooth passage for the Bakun and 
Baram dam projects as shown above. In answering the question of who development in Sarawak 
should then be for, it becomes clear that one would have to interrogate the structures that inhibit 
fairer inclusion of rural communities into development objectives, and others which consistently 
enrich the state or those with privilege at the expense of the poor.  
 
When asked about the kind of development they want, Sarawak indigenous tribe members are 
firm and clear about pursuing development that supports the preservation of their cultural and 
environmental heritage. As an ethnic Kenyah from Long Ikang shared when asked about an 
alternative to the Baram Dam he opposes, “We don't need big dams. We want micro-hydro 
dams, [which are] more affordable and environmentally friendly.” (Gan) Another villager from 
Long Lutin has a similar opinion: “What we need here in Baram is basic development: a clinic, a 
school, roads, electricity … This is the kind of development we want. We are very firm: we will 
not give up our land. We rely on the land; we want the land for the generations to come.” (The 
Sarawak Report) Unfortunately, the localized and inclusive form of development indigenous 
communities advocate remains far from the dominant development model the Malaysian 
government continues to impose on rural communities over the years. 
 
Through an environmental justice analysis of the issues surrounding indigenous resistance 
against the Baram and Bakun mega dam projects, I showed that the land and infrastructure-based 
rural development model planned for Sarawak manifests in multiple harms to indigenous 
communities, best organized in terms of distribution, recognition and procedural injustices. 
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Indigenous groups in Sarawak resist development projects not to oppose progress, but to seek 
redress for their grievances and strive for more parity in development decisions and outcomes. 
Unfortunately, indigenous communities are attempting to negotiate against a dominant model of 
development imposed by the government, one which draws them into a discourse of 
modernization under very disadvantaged terms and which threatens the very integrity of their 
indigenous livelihoods. 
 
All is not lost, however. On April 27, 2016, the Chief Minister of Sarawak announced the 
cancellation of plans for the Baram Dam, a clear win for the five-year-long resistance movement 
put up by the indigenous communities affected by the dam construction plans (Sibon). While 
indigenous leaders at the frontline of the Baram and Bakun dam resistance would be quick to 
point out the active status of plans for 10 other mega dams in Sarawak, the growing organization 
and resistance to development projects seen as disadvantageous by indigenous communities 
could contribute to the eventual formation of more equitable processes of inclusion in Malaysia. 
What is certain, based on the extent of injustices faced by these communities at present, is that a 
fairer model of development in Sarawak must begin with the official recognition and respect for 
indigenous people, and removal of barriers to democratic participation in discussions and 
processes that lead to local and regional development. 
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